Introduction
The design of contracts for health care is not straightforward due to the peculiar characteristics of the product sold on this market which are well known and will not be recalled here. The literature has long pointed out the existence of a trade-o¤ between the cost of the service, its quality, the own- . In health care, quality is de…ned as a multivariable vector that includes all the aspects of medical care (such as its appropriateness, the investment in technology), other aspects that are not strictly medical, but that can improve hospital stay 1 and some characteristics of the patient that are non-observable. For this reason, even when quality is observable, it is non-contractible because the clause would not be enforceable. 2 The common feature of these models is that the quality is not veri…able and it is determined by running costs. However, the most recent literature points out that technological changes produce substantial improvement in prognosis for several ailments (Baker and Phibbs, 2002a,b; Medtap, 2004 , Bokhari, 2001 ; HTC 2003), i.e. quality of health care is strictly related to the level of investment in new technology. In this light, treating quality as a run- 1 These are services such as the number of beds per room, visiting hours, private telephones, nurses per ward, etc. 2 For the de…nition of observable but non-veri…able variables in contract theory see e.g.
La¤ont and Martimort (2002).
ning cost is no longer satisfactory. For this reason, in our model we assume that medical care is the main determinant of quality which is in turn the result of an investment decision in health care technology. Once the hospital has made a speci…c quality-improving investment, the decision is irreversible and the investment determines the quality level of the care produced by that provider for the years to come. The investment in medical quality considered in this paper is an impure public good. When the technology is innovative, it requires higher operating set-up costs, but it produces a positive externality on the rest of the scienti…c community because the followers in introducing the technology will face lower costs since they can acquire the learning process of the leader at no cost; in this respect the investment in medical quality is a privately provided public good (Bergstrom et al., 1986) . These assumptions shift the focus of the incentive-compatible contract from cost revelation to intertemporal investment decisions. The aim of this paper is in fact to deal with those non-market strategies the purchaser can implement to enhance quality in a setting where this variable depends on an irreversible investment which produces a positive externality. We carry out the analysis using the method proposed by the real option literature which, starting from the seminal works by Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and McDonald and Siegel (1986) , has highlighted the analogy between security options and the opportunities to invest in real assets. 3 This literature stresses the fact that when costs are sunk and there is uncertainty over future rewards, the timing of the investment decision is crucial. In particular it shows that irreversibility and uncertainty induce the …rm to optimally invest only when the value of the investment exceeds the value of the option of waiting before making 3 An excellent survey of the main theory is given in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Trigeorgis (1996) , see also Dixit (1992) and Pindyck (1988) .
the irreversible decision. 4 This approach allows us to introduce modularity which is peculiar to much investment in hospital care. 5 our assumptions since quality is assumed to be the result of an investment decision and it is irreversible. In the above paper, however, the intertemporal setting is not developed as the authors concentrate their analysis on the e¤ects of non-contractibility of quality 6 and the hospital that …rst innovates does not produce any positive externality on the followers. On a formal level we develop a two-period partial equilibrium model à la Abel et al. (1996) where the hospital is allowed to expand its capacity by making an investment in health care technology now or in the future. In this environment we study the relationship between investment in quality when it is innovative (i.e. the …rst period) and a long-term contract with the hospital. The main …ndings of our paper can be summarised as follows: 4 This is indeed an application of the "bad news principle of irreversible investment" (Bernanke, 1983). 5 As an example we can consider a PET scan. The hospital can decide to buy a mobile appliance whose cost can be shared among several hospitals, it can decide to build its own PET centre and it can …nally decide to produce its own radio drug. 6 Bös and De Fraja (2000) show that the hold-up problem that emerges in this case may be alleviated if the health authority arranges to purchase the service from providers other than the hospital.
a) Hospitals make substantial investment in the …rst period (i.e. when technology is new) only if they are o¤ered long-term contracts (a twoperiod contract in our model); if this is not the case, the investment in quality at t = 1 will be minimum and its intertemporal allocation will mean that hospitals invest in a technology only when it is a mature, well-established technique. This result is in line with the re- c) Finally, the adoption of the technology at t = 1 implies a higher cost for patients treated so that the purchaser faces a trade-o¤ between quality, technological content of the care provided and average cost of provision. 7 The introduction of protocols, like the guidelines issued by NICE and NCQA, for the treatment of speci…c ailments allows ex post veri…cation of the appropriateness of the care o¤ered.
The paper will be organised as follows: in the next section the features of the model are presented, in section 3 the hospital's investment decision is presented, in section 4 we show how quality decisions at time 1 vary with the purchasing rule and, lastly, section 5 concludes the paper.
The model
The model deals with the investment choices of a representative hospital in a two-period framework as a proxy for long-term contracts. To simplify the analysis, we assume that patients can be a¤ected only by one disease that requires a standard treatment. The production process is uncertain, however, due to productivity shocks deriving from personal characteristics of the patient or from input prices. Health care is an input into a process that leads to recovery. The personal ability of each individual to take advantage of the treatment determines the quantity of resources to be used. The price of the treatment might also vary because of a change in the input prices, in the protocols or the guidelines set up for the treatment of a particular ailment. In this paper we do not make any speci…c assumption about the organisation of health care so that the purchaser might alternatively be a pro…t maximising insurance company, an HMO or a benevolent health authority that wishes to maximise patient welfare through the supply of hospital care and the provider might be a private individual, a pro…t-making institution or a public hospital.
Quality
The traditional literature dealing with contracts for hospital health care assumes that quality is a variable cost which might be observable ex post, but often it is not contractible. 8 We argue that this way of modelling quality might not re ‡ect its actual nature. Quality is a multidimensional vector that includes hotel and medical services. The …rst category de…nes activities that are not strictly medical, but that can improve hospital stay. Medical activities improve the prognosis and the recovery process of each admission.
They include the technology used to treat the patient, the appropriateness of the treatment o¤ered and the motivation/e¤ort of the medical sta¤ in taking care of the patient. Hotel-related quality can be modelled as a variable cost, but the medical dimension derives mainly from an investment decision. Both elements are extremely relevant in determining the patient's utility, but in this paper we restrict our de…nition of quality to medical quality and we argue that this speci…c component depends on the investment in health technology made by the provider. 9 The investment is speci…c, irreversible, can be sequential and determines the type of treatment that can be supplied to the patient. It follows that the decision of the hospital concerning the level of quality to supply becomes an intertemporal decision and the type of contract set by the purchaser is the main variable that determines the quality level of the care to be provided. The assumption that medical quality depends on an investment decision has several e¤ects on the way of approaching the problem:
contracts for health care should have an intertemporal dimension; the trade-o¤ between the investment in quality, contract duration and purchasing rule has to be made explicit; 8 See Malcomson (1998, 2000) . 9 In other words we assume that the treatment o¤ered to the patient is always appropriate given the technology in the hospital.
the intertemporal dimension of the contract makes the medical quality veri…able ex post.
The purchaser
The purchaser can in ‡uence the quality of the treatment o¤ered by setting appropriate contract rules. Chalkley and Malcomson (1998; show that to pursue the maximisation of quality a simple price-quantity schedule is not su¢ cient since it might lead to treating patients with a low bene…t or to delivering too low a quality level. They suggest the use of more sophisticated contracts which in a static framework leads to a payment schedule that depends on the number of patients treated and on those demanding health care. The same authors show that in an intertemporal framework, hold-up and ratchet e¤ects can seriously a¤ect the level of quality. Our paper uses the suggestion of this literature to make the …rst step towards setting an optimal intertemporal contract. Our aim is in fact to show the e¤ects on the provider's investment decision of alternative ways to set the purchasing rule. In our paper we assume that the purchaser rewards the hospital by setting a quality-contingent long-term contract with the hospital where a price p is set for each treatment while the number is quality dependent. The number of patients needing treatment is independent of quality, but the purchaser reimburses the hospital for the treatment of a number of patients x 0 which is …xed in the …rst period and may increase in the second one if the hospital expands its investment in medical quality. In other words, we assume that the health authority is committed to linking the number of patients to be treated in the second period to the investment policy of the hospital x 2 (q 1 ; q 2 ): In particular, in the second period the number of patients increases according to the following linear purchasing rule:
where q 1 is the level of total quality in the …rst period, q 2 q 1 is the increase of quality from period 1 to period 2, and and represent the relative weights. In our paper we focus on four possible combinations which represent alternative strategies the purchaser can follow in incentivating the adoption of the new technology. They are:
> 0 and > 0 : the number of patients reimbursed at t = 2 depends on the level of quality in both periods (we call this the general case). 
The hospital
In our model we assume, like most of the literature on this subject, that the hospital is a surplus maximiser. The hospital's surplus function can be written as: Uq 1 is the stock of quality invested in the …rst period, i 2 denotes investment in period 2 and depreciation is absent. The hospital can invest in quality at unit cost r: 13 In addition to the investment cost, the hospital faces some operating costs in running the new technology. These operating costs di¤er from period to period due to our assumption concerning the nature of the investment decision. In the …rst period the investment in new technology has a multiplicative e¤ect on the cost of producing health care. It comprises set-up costs such as learning cost and human capital formation. Because of the investment in the new technology, such costs are directly related to the size of the investment q rather than the number of patients to be treated x.
In the second period, the extra investment in the same technology causes an increase in the cost due to pure reputation via the rule (1). 14 The operative costs in each period are given by:
reducing variable costs. For further details see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) . 1 3 In section 4.2 we deal with the more general case in which the investment cost at time 2 is lower than the investment cost at time 1, i.e. r2 < r1. 1 4 As an example we might think about introducing laser therapy to treat patients with speci…c ailments. In the …rst period we will have to bear the cost of the equipment and the cost related to teaching the sta¤ how to use the new technology. In the second period the purchase of another laser to treat the same ailment simply increases the cost due to the increase in the number of cases treated.
where 2 R is a parameter capturing productivity shocks as well as the cost of production factors other than quality investment. We also add (0) = 1; 0 (q 1 ) > 0; 00 (q 1 ) < 0; with the regularity conditions lim q!0 0 (q) > 0 and lim q!1 0 (q) = 0: We complete the properties of the cost function by assuming that it is increasing and convex in the number of patients C t xt ; C t xtxt > 0; for t = 1; 2 and we make the following assumption on the costs of the hospital at t = 2: 15
However, if q 1 = 0 the hospital may still invest in the new technology at time 2 but without reputation bene…ts, i.e. C 2 (x; 2 ) for all q: The cost function (3) allows the model to take account of another important characteristic that the investment in medical quality has in health care. This is the innovative content of the treatment o¤ered. In the …rst period the technology is innovative and requires higher operating set-up costs which are in part a positive externality on the rest of the scienti…c community. In the second period the new technology has become established and by making its investment in this period the hospital gains from the positive externality and may have lower operative costs. Without loss of generality, we assume in the paper that C 1 = C 2 = C: 16 The payment per treatment p t can be either 1 5 Note that an increase in q2 determines an increase in the marginal costs Cx 2 x 2 ; plus the reduction in the revenue obtained from the infra-marginal patients x2Cx 2 x 2 x 2 : The condition (4) assures that the latter outweighs the former. Such an assumption is consistent with even simple cost functions. For example let C = (k x) " where " and k are parameters. Then the above assumption is satis…ed for a variety of parameter values including " = 2 and k=3 x < k: 1 6 It is worth pointing out that the quality of results would not change if we assumed
a DRG tari¤ or any other form of prospective price for a speci…c treatment based on marginal cost of production. Following Bös and De Fraja (2000) we set p t = C t xt (x t ; q t ; t ); t = 1; 2. 17 The cost reimbursement scheme and equation (1) allow us to write the surplus function for the hospital as:
Finally, we introduce uncertainty in the model through the productivity shock . We assume that 1 is known and normalised to 1 while 2 is stochastic and its realisation is characterised by the cumulative distribution ( ) with density 0 ( ) > 0 on 2 [0; 1), which is obseved by the hospital and the purchaser. 18 3 The hospital' s investment decision bears no risk on the running cost. However, since q 2 depends on 2 also q 1 is a¤ected by its realisation and in this respect it introduces uncertainty in our model. The timing of the model can be summarised as follows (Figure 1 ).
At the beginning of period 1, the health authority announces x; the number of patients to be treated in the …rst period and the purchasing rule for the second period. The hospital, knowing 1 and the purchasing rule, decides q 1 . At the beginning of period 2, q 1 becomes veri…able, nature reveals 2 and, conditional on q 1 , the hospital chooses q 2 :
We start by describing the hospital's action in the second period, given the stock of quality q 1 inherited from period 1. We then step back and show how the marginal pro…tability in the …rst period depends on the hospital's expected action in the second period.
Second period
The hospital's surplus at time 2 can be written as:
yet the assumptions on the cost function guarantee that U 2 q 2 (q 2 ; q 1 ; x; ) 0 is continuous and strictly decreasing in q and continuous and strictly increasing in (see Appendix A): For a given stock of q 1 inherited from period 1, we can de…ne a critical value of : 19
At the beginning of period 2, nature reveals and the hospital will adjust its stock of medical quality to the new optimal level that we identify as q 2 ( ):
The stock of quality must satisfy the constraint:
Thus, depending on the inherited stock q 1 ; from (6) it emerges that when > (q 1 ; ); it is optimal for the hospital to invest in extra quality up to the point where the marginal return from quality equals the marginal investment cost (purchasing price) r: On the other hand, when < (q 1 ; ) the pro…tability is so low that the …rm …nds it convenient not to invest, so 1 9 We also get:
Finally, by (3), if q 1 = 0 the surplus of the hospital at time 2 is always constant and then q 2 ( ) = 0 for all values of .
First period
From (5) and (6), the following Lemma holds:
The value of the hospital's investment in medical quality, de…ned as the expected present value of net cash ‡ow accruing to the hospital when the stock of quality in period 1 is q 1 ; is given by the following expression:
where is the discount factor.
Proof. See Appendix A Hence, the …rst period decision problem is simply given by:
The …rst order condition for a maximum yields:
De…ning q sr 1 the stock of medical quality that the hospital would purchase in a short-term contract (i.e. U 1 q 1 (q sr:
; we can write the following proposition:
Proposition 1 A long-term contract increases the investment in period 1:
) q 1 > q (10) is not a¤ected by the decision of quality at time 2. This property comes from the application of the principle of optimality of the dynamic programming. The optimality principle says that an optimal quality path has the property that, given the initial conditions and control values over an initial period, the control over the remaining periods must be optimal for the remaining problem, with the state variable resulting from the early decisions considered in the initial condition (Dixit, 1990, p. 164-166) . Formally this implies …nding a state contingent function q 2 ( ) such that the hospital chooses the quality at time 1 by equating V q 1 (q 1 ; x) to r. Suppose now that the hospital, expecting to report at t = 2 a higher value of investment, chooses at time 1q 2 ( ); withq 2 ( ) > q 2 ( ) for all > . This cannot be an optimal decision. In fact, since V q 1q2 (q 1 ; x) < 0; the hospital can do better by choosingq 2 ( ) = q 2 ( ): the pro…t ‡ow that the …rm expects to obtain by following the policy q 2 ( ) is the best that it can do, at least until t = 2: 20 Finally, since U 1 q 1 (q 1 ; x) 0 is continuous and strictly decreasing in q with lim q 1 !1 U 1 q 1 (q 1 ; x) = 0; we can conclude this section by noting that q sr:
1 is strictly positive, which also implies that:
Corollary 1 q 1 and q 2 q 1 are strictly positive.
Proof. Straightforward from Proposition 1.
2 0 Since at t = 2 the purchaser observes and veri…es q1 ( ); it is always able to infer q2( ) directly from (10) (i.e. q2( ) is uniquely determined by U 2 q 2 (q2( ); q1; x; ) = r). This makes the second period a "pure" non-veri…ability model, i.e. even though the revelation of makes q2 common knowledge between the purchaser and the provider, it cannot be enforced by a third party. To achieve the …rst best allocation, a Nash implementation mechanism is needed. La¤ont and Martimort (2002) , for example, show that the simple incentive compatible contracts used in the adverse selection context with ex ante contracting perform quite well in the case of non-veri…ability and risk neutrality of the hospital. The above, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
Analysis of the results and policy implications 4.1 The trade-o¤ between investment and purchasing rule
We begin analysing the e¤ect of a change in the rule that links the number of patients to be treated to the investment in quality by comparing the three cases presented above. For a better understanding of the role played by the purchasing rule in the hospital's investment decision, let's use the option decomposition of (8) proposed by Abel et al. (1996) . By simply manipulating (8) we are able to write:
Lemma 2 The value of the hospital's investment can be written as:
where:
Proof. See Appendix C
The term G(q 1 ; x) is the hospital's expected present value of returns during the contract keeping the stock of medical quality …xed at q 1 : This can be interpreted as the hospital's value when it does not expand its investment in the second period. The term O(q 1 ; x) indicates the value of the (Call )
option to expand investment in the second period if pro…tability rises above : Equation (11) then has an interesting and immediate interpretation:
when the hospital invests in period 1 it gets the value G(q 1 ; x) but gives up the opportunity or option to invest in the future, valued at O(q 1 ; x):
Similarly to (10), the optimal amount of quality in period 1 depends on a comparison between marginal bene…ts and marginal costs:
Equation ( Proposition 2 The investment in period 1 can be ranked as follows:
Proof. See Appendix D
The last proposition can be interpreted as follows: the policy of incentivating investment in technology only in the second period ( = 0) gives the same result as a short-run contract which, being more ‡exible, should be preferred. A uniform incentive to investing in quality ( = ) produces a better incentive than a short-term contract, but the most e¤ective policy is perfect discrimination ( = 0): the last rule in fact implies that the hospital has the maximum incentive to invest in quality when the purchasing rule implies that only the investment made in the …rst period comes into the decision concerning the number of patients to send to a speci…c hospital.
In other words, setting = 0 washes out the option value of delay held by the hospital. 21 In the latter case, in fact, the purchaser grants a sort of patent to the hospital that has …rst invested in the new technology. The number of patients that can be treated depends only on the level of investment made in the …rst period and those who invest in later periods will not see any increase in the number of cases they may treat. This result has important policy implications: even if the level of investment can be observed ex post, asymmetry of information can be ruled out of the system. When the contract is signed, the purchaser cannot observe the level of investment in health technology, but he will be able to do so before implementing the relevant part of the contract. In our model this is a su¢ cient deterrent to cheating on the level of investment in the …rst period. In the second period the issue becomes irrelevant since the new investment is not considered in the decision of how many patients to send to a speci…c hospital. Finally, we further investigate the e¤ect of a change in the purchasing rule by totally di¤erentiating the …rst order condition (10) with respect to :
This expression must be evaluated at the maximum of the hospital's investment choice, that is at the point at which V q 1 (q 1 ; x) r = 0: Since at this point V q 1 q 1 (q 1 ; x) < 0 by the second order condition, the sign of (13) is driven by the numerator:
is generally positive, the slope of the relationships between q 1 and turns out to be negative, i.e. 
The trade-o¤ between quality and investment cost
So far we have assumed that r 2 = r 1 = r: However the cost of many health care technologies decreases as time goes by. A good example is MR scanners, 2 2 To be precise, for any given > the optimal investment at t = 2 requires:
from which we can show that:
As is evident, the sign of (15) is generally positive except for value of close to where it may turn negative:
the cost of which for a …xed technological level still decreases over time. This can be done by simply assuming that r 2 = (1 )r with 0 < < 1 and substituting it into the equation (12) . Direct inspection shows that a¤ects only the option value
where is evaluated by (6) taking account of the lower cost (1 )r. The derivative of O q 1 with respect to gives
and, since @ @ < 0; we can conclude (see Figure 2) :
The investment in period 1 decreases as the cost in period 2
except when = 0 where the e¤ ect is nil:
Proof. Straightforward from (12), (16) and proposition 2.
The second part of the corollary follows from the fact that = 0 eliminates the option value to delay the investment by the hospital and for this reason there is no advantage in waiting to invest. …gure 2
Conclusions
This paper examines the relationship between purchasing rules and medical quality when quality depends on an irreversible investment decision.
The level of investment is observable ex post while costs are subject to uncertainty. We concentrate on the response of a representative hospital to di¤erent purchasing rules set by the purchaser. The hospital is a surplus maximising unit that has to take decisions in a two-period model in a context of uncertainty and asymmetry of information. Uncertainty has several dimensions that relate to the cost of provision and to the innovation process while asymmetry of information derives from the observation of quality of health care only ex post. We de…ne quality as an investment decision in health technology that produces a positive externality in the …rst period of its application. The investment is in fact assumed to be innovative only in the …rst period of its application when costs are higher due to the learning process. In the following period the hospital faces only set-up and/or expansion costs. We show that a trade-o¤ exists between the duration of the contract and quality. In particular a one-period short-term contract is not e¤ective in promoting investments in innovative technology, as one might expect. The purchasing rule chosen is also very important. We show that the most e¤ective incentive to investing in new technology is to make the number of patients to be treated by a hospital depend only on the level of investment in the …rst period. In this case the purchaser gives a sort of patent to the hospital that has …rst invested in the new technology since those who invest in later periods will not see any increase in the number of cases they may treat. This patent is able to cancel out the hospital's option value to delay the investment. This policy can be applied only in a context where patients'choice is ruled out. If patients could choose where to go, the purchaser would not be able to control the ‡ow of patients going to di¤erent hospitals and the incentive to invest might be reduced. This consideration opens up the discussion on another topical theme in health economics, i.e.
patients' choice and its consequences on the system. From this analysis it seems that a trade-o¤ might exist between the level of investment and pa-tients' choices, but these e¤ects should be explored further. Several other extensions can be proposed. In our paper the purchaser does not play an active role: the further logical step in our analysis would be to de…ne an objective function for the purchaser and to …nd the optimal contract in this environment. The e¤ect of di¤erent pricing rules could also be studied. In our model, in fact, we assume that the provider is reimbursed using a marginal cost pricing rule, but in health care prospective, mixed and incentive compatible payment systems are also used.
A Proof of Lemma 1
Let's …rst describe the properties of the hospital's surplus function (5) . From (??), (3) , (4) and (5), easy computation shows that at t = 1 we get:
with the properties:
At t = 2; the hospital's surplus is:
with x 2 (q 1 ; q 2 ) x + q 1 + (q 2 q 1 ) and the properties:
and:
Note that an increase in q 2 determines an increase in the marginal costs C x 2 x 2 ; plus reduction in the revenue obtained from the infra-marginal patients x 2 C x 2 x 2 x 2 : Condition (4) assures that the latter outweighs the former.
Finally:
(x 2 (q 1 ; q 2 ))C x 2 x 2 (x 2 (q 1 ; q 2 ); ) > 0
Since the value of the hospital's investment is: by direct substitution of (17) and (20), we obtain (8) in the text.
B Proof of proposition 1
>From (26), the …rst order condition for a maximum yields:
V q 1 (q 1 ; x) U Since by de…nition U 2 q 2 (q 1 ; x; ) = r which implies that q 2 ( ) = q 1 ; the above f.o.c. reduces to: However, since U 2 q 2 (q 2 ( ); q 1 ; x; ) = r, by (21) and (23) we can simplify (27) for any given value of r, a unique value of q 1 exists satisfying equation (28) .
This proves the proposition.
C Proof of Lemma 2
Easy computation shows that (26) can be written as: (17) and (20), we obtain the expression in the text.
D Proof of proposition 2
First of all direct inspection of (8) and (11) shows that G q 1 (q 1 ; x) = V q 1 (q 1 ; x; = 0): Secondly, if = the purchasing rule becomes x 2 = x + q 2 . According to the condition U 2 q 2 (q 2 ( ); q 1 ; x; ) = r the necessary condition for a maximum (10) reduces to:
V q 1 (q 1 ; x; = ) that V q 1 (q 1 ; x; = ) = G q 1 (q 1 ; x) O q 1 (q 1 ; x); which implies that q 1 ( = ) < q 1 ( = 0): Thirdly, as V q 1 (q 1 ; x; = 0) < V q 1 (q 1 ; x; = ) we get the …rst part of the inequality. This concludes the proof of the proposition.
